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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT : Post Mortems

1. The IAC representatives met on 15 February and considered a draft post mortem statement, dated 5 February, on 1953 production.

2. Attached is a revision of the earlier statement incorporating the substance of the 15 February discussion as well as material subsequently received from State.

3. At the meeting, the chairman reserved ONE's position on the need for including a statement on the analysis of Soviet propaganda. After further consideration, we believe that a modified statement such as now appears under paragraph 1 g is both appropriate and helpful.

4. Supplementary points made by the IAC representatives which are not reflected in the present text are:

- a. Terms of reference for NIE's should be gotten out as early as possible to permit the various agencies to make more vigorous use of them as collection guides, at home and in the field.
- b. ONE should be more vigorous in going back to the agencies informally on specific gaps found in the agency contributions to NIE's.

5. Action

Please review the present text and be prepared to meet on it at [10:00 Monday, 26] April, in Room 132 South Building.

2:00 Tuesday 27

Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 April 1954

SUBJECT: POST MORTEM OF 1953 PRODUCTION

The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed during preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during 1953. The principal estimates upon which these findings are based are listed in TAB "A."

1. GENERAL

- a. An improvement in the liaison between operational and intelligence echelons in the field and in Washington would result in the more timely receipt of intelligence and the receipt of additional intelligence. (Example: difficulties of getting firm intelligence on Rhee's intentions and capabilities, encountered in preparation of SE-48.)
- b. Generally, information is more easily obtainable on the Satellites (particularly on East Germany and East Berlin) than on the USSR. Since intelligence on the Satellites is of considerable help in

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analyzing developments in the USSR, an expanded effort should be made to exploit all available channels for obtaining economic, political, and military information on the Satellites.

- c. In view of the relative paucity of information and intelligence on the USSR, it is important that what is available be exploited fully. One of the sources which possibly could be more fully exploited is that of Soviet propaganda.

2. SOVIET BLOC

The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc have been widely recognized for a long time. Many of them will probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for more effort on the resistance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly, the IAC authorized creation of an Ad Hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee on 8 December 1953. Experience during 1953 also indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in the following key areas:

- a. Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet atomic power, accurate estimates of Soviet long-range and fighter aircraft production are of critical

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importance. Strenuous efforts should therefore be continued to improve the basis of estimates of Soviet aircraft production.

- b. Basic Science and Technology. Special emphasis should be put on the collection and research effort in the field of electronics.
- c. Air Offense and Defense. Continued emphasis on weapons having possible dual offensive and defensive mission: missile development and production; and, aircraft development and production.
- d. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Submarine characteristics, particularly propulsion, and of weapons for use with submarines (torpedoes and mines). Of continuing interest are Soviet capabilities and developments in the fields of AW, RW, BW, and CW.
- e. Soviet Defensive Capabilities. Early warning, filter process, and communications relating to air defense. Also airborne radar.
- f. Economic Trends. Basic data on the various sectors of the Soviet economy are inadequate for fully

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satisfactory analyses of economic developments and trends. This points up the need for a continuing collection effort in this field.

- g. European Satellites. Significant gaps in intelligence on the Satellites revolve on the extent and nature of resistance movements, and the nature of the Soviet mechanism for exercising control in these countries.

3. FAR EAST

Many of the intelligence deficiencies in the Communist Far East are similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a whole. The most critical gaps throughout the Far East include:

- a. Sino-Soviet Relations. Our ability to estimate Communist capabilities and courses of action in the Far East will depend to a large extent on our knowledge of the nature of the Sino-Soviet relations. This is largely a collection problem and should be given a very high priority.
- b. Chinese Communist Economy. Experience during 1953, particularly in the preparation of SE-37, indicated a continuing need for more information on Chinese economic development. One important facet is China's transportation capabilities, particularly as these affect Chinese military capabilities.

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- c. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. Despite some improvement, we continued during 1953 to rely too heavily on French sources for information on Viet Minh capabilities and intentions, both military and political, and on Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh. In view of the possibility of a French demand for greater US involvement in the Indochina war, steps to close this gap should be given a very high priority.



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- e. Indonesia. Preparation of EIE-77 and SE-51 revealed the continuing and urgent need for more information on the political orientation of the Indonesian Government and the capabilities and intentions of the Communist and other dissident groups in Indonesia.
- f. Burma. The fluid and confused situation in Burma requires a steady flow of information on the orientation of the Burmese Government and its capabilities and intentions with respect to Communist and other dissident groups.

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5. NEAR EAST-AFRICA

Experience during 1953 indicated that over-all intelligence coverage of the Middle East is good. The top priority targets remain Iran and Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted -- and these were not critical -- were:

- a. Israel. There was inadequate information on the internal political situation, the capabilities of the Israeli armed forces, and the role played by the Israeli army in the determination of Israeli policy toward the Arab states.
- b. Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian border areas, particularly from Kashmir and Nepal, was inadequate in view of increasing Communist interest in the area and indications of increasing friction between these areas and India.
- c. Egypt. Although coverage of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was excellent, further coverage would be useful on the internal political situation, particularly on the activities of the opposition.

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d. Africa. Intelligence coverage of Africa is meager. We rely too heavily on the European metropolises for the limited information we receive on such issues as Communism, nationalism, racial tension, and intertribal relations. Assuming continued growth on the importance of Africa as a raw material source for the US, and growing unrest throughout the continent, broader intelligence coverage will become increasingly important.

6. LATIN AMERICA

Over-all intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. However, important deficiencies exist in the following fields:

a. Military opinion. Fuller reporting is desirable on the political positions of important military figures and on trends in the political views of both senior and junior military officers. With respect to Guatemala, there is a lack of information on the degree of disaffection or anxiety in the officer corps resulting from Arbenz' collaboration with Communists and the army's inability to obtain US military materiel.

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- b. Communism. Fuller information is needed on trends in Communist Party strengths, and on Communist infiltration of government, labor, and intellectual circles, especially in Argentina and Bolivia.
- c. The situation of labor. More concrete information is desired on the political orientation and the economic status of both organized and unorganized labor in all the countries with politically significant labor movements.

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TAB "A"
O/NE Memo
14 April 1954

PRINCIPAL NIE PRODUCTION BASE FOR 1953 POST MORTEM FINDINGS

1. SOVIET BLOC

NIE-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957

NIE-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany through Mid-1954

NIE-87 Probable Developments within the European Satellites through Mid-1955

NIE-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955

NIE-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through Mid-1955

SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955

SE-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955

SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare

SE-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR

SE-40 Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"

SE-42 Current Communist Tactics

SE-46 Probable Long-Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions

SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developments in Eastern Germany on Soviet Policy with Respect to Germany

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2. FAR EAST

NIE-74 Probable Developments in Burma through 1953

NIE-77 Probable Developments in Indonesia

NIE-80 Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea

NIE-91 Probable Developments in Indochina through 1954

SE-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China

SE-45 Thailand's Ability to Withstand Communist Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1954

SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea

SE-51 The Significance of the New Indonesian Government

SE-53 Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible Developments in Indochina

3. WESTERN EUROPE

NIE-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western Security System

NIE-63/1 Probable Short Term Developments in French Policy

NIE-71 Probable Outlook for Italy

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NIE-93 Probable Developments in Yugoslavia

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SE-54 The Political Outlook in Italy

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4. NEAR EAST AFRICA

NIE-73 Conditions and Trends in the Middle East
 Affecting US Security

NIE-75/1 Probable Developments in Iran through 1953

NIE 76 Probable Developments in Egypt

NIE-79 Probable Developments in South Asia

NIE-83 Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa

NIE-92 Israel

NIE-102 Probable Developments in Iran through 1954

SE-49 The Current Outlook in Iran

5. LATIN AMERICA

NIE-84 Probable Developments in Guatemala

NIE-85 Probable Developments in Chile

NIE-86 Probable Developments in Brazil

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